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 OPINION 
                      
 
ACKERMAN, District Judge. 
 
 
 These two cases present the following discrete issue: In an 
action brought pursuant to the  Worker Adjustment and Retraining 
Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. §2101 et seq. ("WARN"), a statute 
which, like so many others, fails to explicitly provide a statute 
of limitations, should we follow the general rule and borrow a 
state statute of limitations or should we instead opt for the 
six-month statute of limitations set forth in section 10(b) of 
the federal National Labor Relations Act.  The two cases present 
the identical issue for review and we will consider both cases in 
this Opinion. 
 For the reasons detailed below, we find that for cases 
arising under WARN, courts should apply the most closely 
analogous state statute of limitations.  Thus, we will reverse 
the decision in Thomas v. North Star Steel and will affirm the 
decision in United Steelworkers of America v. Crown, Cork & Seal. 
 
 Background 
 Both of the underlying cases were filed pursuant to WARN, a 
federal statute which requires companies with one hundred or more 
employees to provide their workers with a minimum of sixty days 
written notice before a plant closing or mass layoff.1  Employers 
who fail to provide the requisite notice must compensate 
employees suffering an employment loss for each day of the 
violation.  The statute creates a private civil action for 
damages in federal court.   
                     
     1 The statute defines "plant closing" as the permanent or 
temporary shutdown of a single site of employment, which results 
in an employment loss to a certain minimum number of employees. 
29 U.S.C. §2101(a)(2).  "Mass layoff" is defined as a reduction-
in-force, resulting from a plant closing, which results in a 
certain minimum employment loss.  29 U.S.C. §2101(a)(3).  A 
layoff must last more than six months before it qualifies as 
actionable under WARN. 29 U.S.C. §2101(a)(6)(B). 
 On September 9, 1991, the United Steelworkers of America, 
AFL-CIO-CLC, filed a complaint in federal court alleging that the 
North Star Steel Company ("North Star") had violated the WARN Act 
by failing to give the union sixty days advance notice of a 
February 25, 1991 layoff of about 270 people, at the company's 
Milton, Pennsylvania plant.  Although the suit was filed more 
than six months after the layoff occurred, North Star did not 
raise the statute of limitations as a defense.  On April 9, 1992, 
the district court granted the union's motion for summary 
judgment on liability, holding that the layoff constituted a 
"plant closing" subject to WARN.  In a separate Order, dated 
December 11, 1992, the district judge determined the number of 
days for which the company was required to pay WARN damages.  
United Steelworkers v. North Star Steel, 809 F. Supp. 5, 6-7 
(M.D.Pa. 1992), aff'd 5 F.3d 39 (1993). 
 Appellants were non-unionized employees of North Star, 
unrepresented by the union and hence unaffected by the union's 
successful lawsuit against North Star.  They therefore filed a 
separate action, the instant case, also seeking damages pursuant 
to WARN.  On May 25, 1993, the district court granted North 
Star's motion for summary judgment, finding that the action was 
barred under what it deemed to be the applicable statute of 
limitations.  The employees' motion for reconsideration was 
denied on August 26, 1993.  This appeal followed.   
 United Steelworkers of America v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 
Inc. ("Crown Cork"), arises out of an event that took place on  
September 30, 1991.  On that day, the company ordered a 
reduction- in-force and shutdown of its Perry, Georgia plant.  As 
a result of this reduction in force, about 85 employees were 
terminated.  On October 15, 1992, the United Steelworkers of 
America (the union) filed a complaint, alleging that the company 
violated WARN by failing to give it 60 days notice prior to the 
shutdown.  Crown, Cork & Seal then moved for summary judgment, 
contending that the action was barred by the applicable statute 
of limitations.  The district court denied the motion on August 
24, 1993 but in an order dated September 26, 1993, certified the 
August order for immediate interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §1292.   
 We have jurisdiction over the appeal in Thomas v. North Star 
Steel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291.  Our jurisdiction over United 
Steelworkers of America v. Crown, Cork & Seal arises from our 
October 13, 1993 Order granting the company permission to appeal 




 In this case we visit a general question of federal law that 
we have repeatedly addressed:  When a federal statute does not 
contain an explicit statute of limitations, when is it 
appropriate to borrow a statute of limitations from elsewhere in 
federal law rather than adopting the most closely analogous state 
statute of limitations. 
   The companies argue that in this case, a federal statute -- 
the six-month statute of limitations contained in section 10(b) 
of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") for filing a claim 
of an unfair labor practice with the National Labor Relations 
Board ("NLRB") -- provides the most appropriate limitations 
period.  The employees and the union exhort us to borrow one of 
various state statutes.  Courts addressing the question have 
adopted both approaches.  Some have borrowed the six-month §10(b) 
statute; see, e.g., Newspaper and Mail Delivers' Union of N.Y. 
and Vicinity v. United Magazine Co., 809 F. Supp. 185 (E.D.N.Y. 
1992) (adopting NLRA statute); Staudt v. Glastron, Inc., No. SA-
92-CA-1174, 1993 WL 85356, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3090 (W.D.Tex. 
February 23, 1993) (same).  Other courts, including the only 
Court of Appeals to reach the question, have expressly considered 
and rejected the section 10(b) six-month period, instead opting 
for various state law limitations periods.  See, e.g.  United 
Paperworkers Local 340 v. Specialty Paperboard, Inc., 999 F.2d 51 
(2d Cir. 1992) (hereinafter United Paperworkers); Wallace v. 
Detroit Coke Corp., 818 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (rejecting 
NLRA statute and adopting six-year state contract statute); 
Automobile Mechanics' Local No. 701 of the Int'l Assoc. of 
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Santa Fe Terminal Services, 
Inc., 830 F. Supp. 432 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (rejecting NLRA statute 
and adopting, without specifying, most analogous state statute).   
 The two district court opinions before us now reached 
contrary conclusions.  The district court in North Star Steel 
adopted the six-month statute of limitations set forth in §10(b); 
the court in Crown, Cork & Seal rejected the §10(b) statute, and 
without deciding the appropriate statute of limitations, found 
the action timely under all of the possibilities. 
 Our analysis must begin with the general assumption that 
when a federal statute is silent as to a statute of limitations, 
the court should apply "the most closely analogous statute of 
limitations under state law."  DelCostello v. International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158 (1983); see also 
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 
350, ____, 111 S.Ct. 2773, 2778 (1991); Haggerty v. USAIR, Inc., 
952 F.2d 781, 783 (3d Cir. 1992).  This general rule is not set 
in stone, however.  Rather, the United States Supreme Court has 
recognized that, in order to prevent frustration of federal 
policy, it is sometimes more appropriate to borrow a limitations 
period from an analogous area of federal law.  DelCostello, 462 
U.S. at 162.  This exception is "closely circumscribed", see Reed 
v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 324 (1989), and should 
only be applied "when a rule from elsewhere in federal law 
clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, 
and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of 
litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate 
vehicle for interstitial lawmaking".  DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 
172. 
 In following the principles enunciated in DelCostello and 
Reed, we repeatedly have recognized our duty "to take seriously 
[the Supreme Court's admonition] that analogous state statutes of 
limitations are to be used unless they frustrate or significantly 
interfere with federal policies." Reed, 488 U.S. at 327.  For 
instance, the mere fact that a statute touches upon issues of 
labor law does not mean that the Court must resort to the statute 
of limitations contained in §10(b) of the NLRA.  Thus, in 
Eichleay Corp. v. Intern. Ass'n of Bridge, Structural and 
Ornamental Iron Workers, 944 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1991), we applied 
a state statute of limitations for vacating arbitration awards to 
an action to enforce an arbitration awards pursuant to §301 of 
the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §185.  Similarly, 
in Brenner v. Local 514, United Brothers of Carpenters, 927 F.2d 
1283 (3d Cir. 1991), we remanded the case to the district court 
to apply the most closely analogous state statute of limitations 
to a §301 claim of retaliation against internal union activities.  
In Grasty v. Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, 828 
F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042 (1988), we 
applied Pennsylvania's four-year breach of contract statute of 
limitations to a union member's claim that the union failed to 
rebate dues and improperly charged disabled workers.  In this 
case, as in those, the federal statute may be borrowed only if it 
clearly provides a closer analogy than the available state 
statutes.  Answering this question requires us to focus on the 
respective policies behind the NLRA and WARN. 
 The primary purpose of the NLRA is "to protect the right of 
workers to join together in labor organizations and collectively 
bargain for the terms and conditions of employment."  United 
Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 54; see also Fort Halifax Packing Co., 
Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1987).  The statute "is 
concerned with ensuring an equitable bargaining process, not with 
the substantive terms that may emerge from such bargaining."  
Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 20 (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 
v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985)).  More specifically, as 
the Supreme Court noted in Reed, the NLRA has "effects upon the 
formation and operation of the collective-bargaining agreement 
between the employer and the bargaining representative, and upon 
the private settlement of disputes under that agreement through 
grievance-and-arbitration procedures".  Reed, 488 U.S. at 329.  
The NLRA, then, is concerned with the importance and integrity of 
a process.  From the NLRA's perspective, "minimum terms of 
employment" that may arise from another federal statute -- or 
from the process of collective bargaining itself -- are 
irrelevant so long as the process is fair.   
 The six-month statute of limitations set forth in §10(b) 
represents Congress's view of the proper balancing of the various 
interests involved in the process of collective bargaining.  The 
six-month period takes into account "the national interests in 
stable bargaining relationships and finality of private 
settlements, and an employee's interest in setting aside what he 
views as an unjust settlement under the collective-bargaining 
system." DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171 (quoting United Parcel 
Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 70-71 (1980) (opinion 
concurring in the judgment)).  In DelCostello itself, it was 
precisely this direct effect on the collective bargaining process 
that led the Court to invoke the §10(b) statute of limitations.  
That case involved a §301 hybrid suit (1) against an employer for 
breach of a collective bargaining agreement pursuant to the 
LMRDA, and (2) against a labor union for breach of the duty of 
fair representation.  Such a hybrid action really alleges that 
the process of collective bargaining has broken down.  Thus, the 
NLRA policies applied: "The employee's interest in setting aside 
the 'final and binding' determination of a grievance through the 
method established by the collective-bargaining agreement 
unquestionably implicates 'those consensual processes that 
federal labor law is chiefly designed to promote -- the formation 
of the . . . agreement and the private settlement of disputes 
under it.'"  DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171 (quoting Mitchell, 451 
U.S. at 70-71 (opinion concurring in judgment)). 
 In DelCostello, the parallels between the cause of action 
and the policies behind the NLRA were unmistakable.  In Reed, 
however, the Supreme Court, while acknowledging that many 
employment-related statutes affecting labor will in some way 
affect the collective bargaining process, cautioned that even 
plausible "tangential and remote" effects upon collective 
bargaining are insufficient to warrant departure from the general 
rule.  Reed, 488 U.S. at 330, 331.  Thus, the Court refused to 
borrow the §10(b) NLRA statute of limitations to govern a union 
member's free speech claim against the union. 
 WARN falls into this latter category -- any effects it has 
on collective bargaining are tangential at best.  The benefits of 
WARN accrue not only to unionized workers but to all workers 
alike.  WARN, like dozens of other employment statutes which 
bestow substantive rights simply "gives employees something for 
which they otherwise might have to bargain."  Fort Halifax, 482 
U.S. at 21 (addressing Maine plant closing law).  That is why in 
that case, the Supreme Court held that the NLRA did not preempt a 
Maine statute providing protection to workers from plant 
closings.  Unlike the NLRA, the Maine regulation "provide[d] 
protection to individual union and nonunion workers alike, and 
thus 'neither encourage[d] nor discourage[d] the collective 
bargaining processes . . . ." Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 21 
(quoting Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 755).   The WARN 
protections, like the Maine plant closing law discussed in Fort 
Halifax, is also properly understood as establishing part of the 
"backdrop" of rights that the parties bring to the collective 
bargaining table, and not as affecting the substantive rights 
that may emerge from the collective bargaining discussions.  Fort 
Halifax, 482 U.S. at 21. 
 WARN serves a broader purpose as well, that goes beyond the 
employer-employee relationship addressed by the NLRA.  The 
statute mandates that employers planning a plant closing or mass 
lay-off must notify the "chief elected official of the unit of 
local government within which such closing or layoff is to 
occur". 29 U.S.C. §2102(a)(2) Employers who fail to comply with 
the provision are subject to civil penalties of $500 per day. 29 
U.S.C. §2104(a)(3).  Thus, WARN serves very broad societal goals 
-- to protect workers, their families and their communities in 
the wake of potentially harmful employment decisions. Its 
remedial nature really has very little to do with the day to day 
process of collective bargaining. 
 To be sure, it cannot be said that WARN has no effect on 
collective bargaining.  The companies point out, for example, 
that under the NLRA, an employer must provide notice to 
represented workers, in order to give the workers the opportunity 
for meaningful bargaining.  See, e.g. First National Maintenance 
Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681 (1981).  This fact does present 
a superficial resemblance between the NLRA and WARN, but on 
closer inspection, it highlights the difference.  The rights 
bestowed by the NLRA focus solely on the need for a meaningful 
collective bargaining process; WARN provides an across-the-board 
substantive right.  The implementing regulations of the statute 
highlight this crucial distinction by providing that 
"[c]ollective bargaining agreements may be used to clarify or 
[to] amplify the terms and conditions of WARN, but may not reduce 
WARN rights."  20 C.F.R. §639.1(g) (emphasis added).  In other 
words, the NLRA requires notice to protect the meaningfulness of 
the collective-bargaining process; WARN's purpose is to 
substantively protect employees and their communities. 
 The fact that courts have looked to NLRA cases in 
interpreting WARN, and the fact that there are some definitional 
overlaps, does not change this fundamental distinction between 
the two statutes.  At best, WARN has a family resemblance to the 
NLRA. In Brenner v. Local 514, United Brothers of Carpenters, 927 
F.2d 1283 (3d Cir. 1991), we rejected the proposition that a 
family resemblance is sufficient to justify adopting the §10(b) 
statute of limitations.  There, we held that a claim against a 
union for breach of the duty of fair representation, while having 
some effect upon the collective bargaining atmosphere, did not 
have an effect sufficient enough to counsel adoption of the 
federal statute. Id. at 1295.  In order to justify departing from 
the general rule, the analogy must be more direct.2   
 As the Second Circuit pointed out in United Paperworkers, 
courts adopting the section 10(b) statute of limitations for WARN 
actions "have failed to grasp this crucial distinction between 
statutes which specifically regulate the collective bargaining 
relationship and those which remain peripheral to that concern."  
United Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 55. 
 Nonetheless, despite the vast gulf between the respective 
policies behind the NLRA and WARN, the companies look for relief 
in our own prior decision of Haggerty v. USAir.  Their reliance 
is misplaced.  That case addressed the Employee Protection 
Program of the Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. §1552(d)(1) 
(1988) ("EPP"), a federal statute which provided certain air 
carrier employees with a right of first hire against other air 
carriers.  The EPP directly affected the collective bargaining 
environment by impacting on "the seniority relationships of other 
                     
     2 The lack of similarity between the NLRA and WARN becomes 
even starker when one looks at the remedies afforded by the 
respective statutes.  Under the NLRA, the National Labor 
Relations Board has broad discretion to "'take such affirmative 
action including reinstatement of employees . . . as will 
effectuate the policies of [the Act]' to remedy an employer's 
unfair labor practices."  Tubari Ltd., Inc. v. NLRB, 959 F.2d 
451, 453 (3d Cir. 1992).  WARN by its very terms precludes such 
broad equitable relief;  "[A] Federal court shall not have 
authority to enjoin a plant closing or mass layoff." (emphasis 
added).  Similarly, the NLRB's discretion in awarding back pay is 
broad.  See Tubari, 959 F.2d at 453.  WARN, though, provides a 
strict statutory mechanism for computing damages. 
employees . . . ."  Haggerty, 952 F.2d at 787.  As in 
DelCostello, this direct impact on the collective bargaining 
environment required a statute of limitations that furthered the 
need for the rapid resolution of labor disputes.  And since, as 
we noted in Haggerty itself, the airline industry was nearly 90% 
unionized and the right-to-hire program was inserted into the 
statute at the insistence of unions, the six-month section 10(b) 
statute of limitations was the obvious choice.3 
 In determining whether to apply a federal statute of 
limitations, we also have considered whether the federal policies 
at stake and the practicalities of litigation make the NLRA 
statute "a significantly more appropriate vehicle for 
interstitial lawmaking".  DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 172; Haggerty, 
952 F.2d at 786.  The companies argue that WARN requires a single 
federal statute of limitations, because subjecting the companies 
to multiple state statutes of limitations would make it difficult 
for employers to calculate their contingent liabilities.   
 This case simply does not present serious uniformity 
concerns.  The need for uniformity becomes real only when the 
federal statute at issue contains numerous types of claims and 
legal theories or when the prospect of multiple state statutes of 
limitation presents serious practical problems.  Uniformity 
concerns motivated the Supreme Court in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 
                     
     3  We also found that "as with the NLRA, the Department of 
Labor has had a role in administering the EPP as the agency 
charged with maintaining a listing of airline vacancies for the 
use of protected employees under the EPP."  Haggerty, 952 F.2d at 
787. 
U.S. 261 (1985), to apply a uniform limitations period (a state 
limitations period in that case) to claims arising under 42 
U.S.C. §1983.  As the Court pointed out, claims under the broad 
civil rights statute "would encompass numerous and diverse topics 
and subtopics."  Wilson, 471 U.S. at 273.  Thus, "[i]f the choice 
of the statute of limitations were to depend upon the particular 
facts or the precise legal theory of each claim, counsel could 
almost always argue, with considerable force, that two or more 
periods of limitations should apply to each §1983 claim."  Id. at 
273-74.  The Court used similar reasoning in Agency Holding Corp. 
v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987):  Since 
RICO "encompass[es] numerous diverse topics and subtopics . . . a 
uniform statute of limitations is required to avoid intolerable 
'uncertainty and time-consuming litigation.'"  Id. at 149-50 
(quoting Wilson, 471 U.S. at 273, 272).     
 In Haggerty, we relied on uniformity concerns in deciding to 
apply the section 10(b) statute.  Under the EPP, a protected 
employee who had been terminated or furloughed could claim a 
right of first hire with any other carrier that was hiring 
employees.  We noted that airline carriers would have difficulty 
"managing a cohesive policy with respect to the EPP were they 
subject to the varying limitations periods of each of the states 
in which they operate."  Haggerty, 952 F.2d at 786.  Thus, 
without a uniform federal statute of limitations, the entire 
airline industry faced constant and protracted uncertainty. 
 Unlike RICO and Section 1983, WARN contains but a single 
cause of action, and all WARN claims involve nearly identical 
fact patterns and discrete inquiries.  And unlike the EPP, under 
which an airline may be the fortuitous victim of events involving 
other air carriers all across the country, WARN's obligations 
simply do not implicate such geographic concerns favoring 
uniformity.  As the Second Circuit put it: 
 "The term 'plant closing' as defined by the Act is limited 
to single sites of employment, and venue is limited to the 
district where the violation is alleged to have occurred or 
where the employer does business; unless a single plant site 
straddles the boundary between two states, it is unlikely 
prospective plaintiffs will have a broad choice of fora in 
which to bring their claims or that doubt will arise as to 
in which state triggering events occurred.  Therefore, 
geographic considerations do not counsel for the application 
of a uniform federal limitations period for WARN Act 
claims."  United Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 56 (quoting 
district court opinion). 
 
Because of these same factors, "courts will have little 
difficulty in determining which state's law to apply and workers 
will gain few advantages by suing in a court far from the site of 
injury."  United Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 56.4 
                     
     4 Since the Crown, Cork & Seal action occurred in Perry, 
Georgia, there is a question as to whether the statute of 
limitations should be borrowed from Georgia or Pennsylvania law.  
We have previously held that "as a general rule the governing 
statute of limitations should be that of the state in which the 
federal court sits, unless a party can make a compelling showing 
that the application of that statutory time bar would seriously 
frustrate federal labor policy or work severe hardship to the 
litigants."  Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping 
Association, Inc., 602 F.2d 494, 507-08 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated 
on other grounds, 448 U.S. 902 (1980).  We need not decide 
whether the statute of limitations should be borrowed from 
Pennsylvania or Georgia law, since no party has brought to the 
lower courts' attention a statute of limitations, from either 
state, under which the instant actions would be untimely. 
 The companies' further concern about the effect of a plant 
closing on service of process, and on the mechanics of 
litigation, simply do not implicate federal concerns; rather, 
they are the same concerns at issue in every cause of action, 
whenever the statute of limitations is longer then a year or so.   
 On the other hand, a short statute of limitations could very 
well frustrate the policies behind WARN.  As the Second Circuit 
found, under the complex administrative scheme of the NLRA, in 
which the NLRB plays a large and active role in prosecuting 
claims, "[t]he burden on complainants in pursuing a claim is 
minimal, justifying the short statute of limitations."  United 
Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 55.  WARN does not contain those 
administrative safeguards, and a six-month statute could very 
well constitute too great a burden on the claimants. 
 Finally, cases finding that the practicalities of litigation 
favor adoption of a federal statute of limitations have focused 
on the problems with the potential state statutes.  For example, 
in DelCostello, the Court pointed out that the two possible state 
statutes were inconsistent with the relevant federal policy 
favoring the finality of settlements and the opportunity to 
attack an unfair result under collective bargaining.  The 
extremely short time periods in state arbitration statutes "fail 
to provide an aggrieved employee with a satisfactory opportunity 
to vindicate his rights under §301 and the fair representation 
doctrine."  Id. at 166.  Conversely, the relatively lengthy time 
period governing legal malpractice claims "would preclude the 
relatively rapid final resolution of labor disputes favored by 
federal law -- a problem not present when a party to a commercial 
arbitration sues his lawyer."  Id. at 168.   
 Here, the state statutes of limitations brought to the lower 
courts' attention -- which range from the two-year period for 
enforcing civil penalties under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §5524(5) 
to Pennsylvania's six-year residual statute of limitations, 42 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §5527 --  do not interfere with federal 
policy.5  Because of WARN's remedial nature and its limited 
effect on collective bargaining, a short statute of limitations 
is unnecessary.  And none of the state statutes are so short as 
to interfere with a worker's potential for seeking or gaining 
relief.  While we acknowledge that none of the possible state 
laws provide perfect analogies to WARN, the absence of a perfect 
analogy is an insufficient reason to depart from the general 
rule, particularly when federal law does not provide a 
satisfactory alternative. See, e.g., DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 
171; Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 847 (3d Cir. 
1987).   
 Here, we need not decide which state statute applies, since 
the actions would be timely under any of the possible statutes of 
limitations brought to the court's attention. 
 
 CONCLUSION 
                     
     5 Other possible state statutes of limitations include the 
three year period set forth in 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. §260.9a(g) for 
bringing claims under the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and 
Collection Law, and the four year limitations period for breach 
of an implied contract, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §5525(4).  
 We conclude that, for the reasons detailed above, for 
actions arising under WARN, courts must apply the most closely 
analogous state statute of limitations.  We therefore will affirm 
the district court's Order in United Steelworkers of America v. 
Crown, Cork & Seal denying Crown, Cork & Seal's motion for 
summary judgment.  We will reverse the Order of the district 
court in Thomas v. North Star Steel granting North Star's motion 
for summary judgment in favor of North Star.  These cases will be 
remanded to the respective district courts for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  Costs taxed against 
the appellant in 93-2008.  Costs taxed against the appellee in 
93-7613. 
